THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES INVOLVED

IN DR. EDWARD CAIRD'S PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

INAUGURAL-DISSERTATION

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PREFACE

The Caird brothers have been recognized for nearly a generation as belonging to the ranks of the most important Scotch philosophers. John Caird, the elder of the two, was principal of the University of Glasgow. Edward, the author of the work here reviewed, was for some time professor of Moral Philosophy in the same university. After resigning this position, he became master of Balliol College, Oxford, which position he filled until quite recently. Previous to the appearance of this work, he had proven his ability as a philosopher by his *Critical Philosophy of Kant,* and *The Social Philosophy and Religion of Comte.* The work here discussed is recognized by friends and foes as one of the clearest and most representative statements of the views of Anglo-Hegelians. The work has been widely read, and the influence of the lectures was so great that none but Hegelians were chosen for some time afterwards to deliver the Gifford Lectures. Dr. Caird professes to write for those who are destitute of faith, but are terrified at scepticism and proposes to show how in a general way the theory of evolution will help those in this frame of mind. It is the purpose of this criticism to show in a general way how the position of Dr. Caird is open to attack.

The following are the chief works used in the preparation of this essay:

Edward Caird, *The Evolution of Religion,* 2 vols., Glasgow, 3rd ed., 1899.

G. W. F. Hegel, *Religionsphilosophie, Werke,* Band 11 and 12;

Richard Falckenberg, *History of Modern Philosophy,* translated by A. C. Armstrong, 1897.

F. Ueberweg, *Grundriß der Geschichte der Philosophie,* Band IV, 10. Aufl. 1906, s. 523, herausgegeben von Dr. M. Heinze;

J. Lindsay, *Recent Advances in Theistic Philosophy,* 1897;

J. J. Johnstone, *Grundzüge der Philosophie von Edward Caird,* Jena, Dissertation, 1905;

A. M. Fairbairn, *The Philosophy of the Christian Religion,* 1903.

Much help has also been derived from the reviews of Dr. Caird's work in the following periodicals:

Athenaeum, July 15, 1893;

The Academy, April 1, 1893 (reviewed by A. W. Benn);

The Critical Review, Vol. 3, No. 2, April, 1893 (reviewed by A. M. Fairbairn);

The International Journal of Ethics, Vol. 4, No. 1, October, 1893 (reviewed by R. Adamson);

Mind, New Series, July, 1893 (reviewed by J. Ellis M'Taggart);

The Philosophical Review, Vol. 3, No. 1, January 1894 (reviewed by James Seth);

The Presbyterian and Reformed Review, January 1895 (reviewed by W. B. Green Jr.);

The Scottish Review, Vol. 23, No. 45, January, 1894 (reviewed by R. M. Wenley).

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THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN DR. CAIRD'S PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION.

I.

THE PROBLEM STATED AND THE SOLUTION PROPOSED.

Dr. Caird starts into the discussion proposed with a buoyant optimism born of the past triumphs of science.[1] He sees that one field of knowledge after another has been explored and the general nature of the facts has become known as well as the general principles required to explain them, just as one continent after another has been explored and the location of the great mountain ranges and great rivers is now roughly known. To be sure, not all is known in any given field, any more than every country has had an ordnance survey map made of it. But the nature of the problems to be mastered is known. The methods of evolution, it is claimed, have yielded good results in biology. Law and order have been found where at first all seemed "accidental, capricious, and meaningless."

The question naturally arises whether these methods will help us in explaining the history of man. For a long time many have believed it impossible to find any laws in the field of anthropology, and it has been especially difficult to give anything like a scientific account of the phenomena of religious life. Hitherto this has been more difficult because many of the religions of the world were unknown to educated men, and it is only recently that they have developed enough ability to give adequate treatment to such phenomena. A new sense of the unity of the human race and a deepening feeling that the race manifests "an organic process of development" makes this an opportune time to attempt a scientific treatment of religion.

[1] When not otherwise indicated, the references are to Dr. Caird's *Evolution of Religion.*

Dr. Caird does not propose to attempt a *science of religion.* This would necessitate some effort at classifying all religions under various heads. Neither does he propose to give us a *philosophy of the Christian religion.* This would involve an effort to show how all the various elements of the Christian religion are related to each other, how Christianity is related to other religions, and to certain philosophical principles. This would require a fuller treatment of Christianity than it is his purpose to give. Again, he says he does not undertake to give an adequate account of the *religious consciousness* or its object.[1] This would necessitate too minute an analysis of consciousness itself to separate the religious from the secular consciousness, and would require some theory of the nature of truth in general. What he does propose to do is to show how in a general way the method of evolution is to be applied to religion and to indicate some of the results that will be obtained.[2] The formulas of evolution are something like algebraic formulas. The values to be assigned to the various terms may change, but correct results are sure to follow if the method is good and the application has been properly made. This is not to be taken to mean that the same principle will explain all phenomena.[3] The laws of chemistry are not the same as the laws of physics. The higher and more complex the phenomena to be explained, the higher must be the principle involved. But the methods, or ways of looking at things, that helped us to discover the principles of one science, will help us in another. If looking at the phenomena treated in zoology and botany from the standpoint of evolution has enabled us to bring scattered things into harmony and order, to look at religion from this standpoint ought to help us in similar manner. Dr. Caird believes that not only religion, but all the phenomena of human history can be measured by this "Lesbian rule of architecture."[4] If it fails here, its importance as a universal rule has been overestimated.

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[1] I, p. 47, line 10. He does, however, devote a great deal of space to the religious consciousness and its object, God.

[2] Preface, pp. IX and XI f; I, p. 9.

[3] I, p. 5

[4] Aristotle's *Ethics,* V, 10. 7.

He starts with the idea that all men *must* be religious.[1] The very nature of their minds requires it. Religion is "an integral element of man's mind, of which he can no more rid himself than he can get rid of the consciousness of the object or of himself"[2]. Not to be religious is not to be conscious. But no individual stands still. His thinking changes. Even his religion is continually changing. And hence the religious ideas of the race as a whole are ever changing. Can we discover any law or order in the change? Can we find any underlying principle that will help us to better understand why the changes go on in one way rather than another?

The gist of Dr. Caird's answer to these questions is: The consciousness of each individual develops in a given order, and the consciousness of the race has developed in the same order. Each individual is conscious first of all, of the physical objects outside of him; next he becomes conscious of himself, — thinks of himself as distinct from the objects around him, and different from them; then lastly, he becomes conscious of God. He first looks *outward;* then *inward,* then *upward.* No one of these elements is present to the exclusion of the others, so that the order would be like that of bud, flower, fruit, but this is the order of their predominance.[3] Consciousness is first largely *objective,* then largely *subjective,* then largely *religious.* The child has in him a consciousness of self and of God, but is not able to see that this is different from his consciousness of objects. He speaks of himself in the third person, and God is thought of as being like objects he can see and touch. Later the child learns to say *I,* and thinks God is like his own mind. In this period of his life, the consciousness of object and subject are fairly sharply distinguished, but the consciousness of God and subject are not. Later comes a period where it is realized that the consciousness of God is distinct from the consciousness of subject and object, and it is felt that God is higher than subject or object and in some way unites them.[4]

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[1] I, p. 68, line 17.

[2] I, p. 201, line 14. Cf. also I, pp. 35 and 59.

[3] I, p. 177 seq. Dr. Caird, however, uses *bud, flower,* and *fruit* to illustrate the various stages of the evolution of religion. Cf. I, p. 40.

[4] I, p. 64 seq.; p. 76 seq.; and p. 205 seq.

Dr. Caird's idea here might be roughly illustrated as follows: If we sit in a room early on a dark and cloudy morning, and gaze out of the window, for a long time we can scarcely see the outlines of the trees near the house. It would be impossible to see anything at all inside the house. But as the day advances, things outside can be distinguished more clearly. After looking at things outside for sometime, we turn toward things in the room itself. It is now light enough to see a few things, but still only a few, and these cannot be seen distinctly. We turn our attention for a few moments to the pictures on the walls, and inspect the curious furniture around us. After looking at things on the inside for awhile, we look once more at things on the outside. It has grown brighter. We can now distinguish everything near us on the outside. And still the light increases. When we look again at the things in the room, we find the increasing light enables us to see new beauties in the pictures and also to discern things we had not seen before. While thus engaged, the sun itself appears, and we realize distinctly that it was its light that enabled us to see what was without as well as what was within. Of course this illustration is not to be pressed too far, but it may help us to understand what Dr. Caird means when he says we first become clearly conscious of what is without us, then of our inner self, and then of God.

This gives us three great stages in the evolution of religion, the objective, the subjective, and that of the true religion. The objective stage is that of primitive man and of the races in the world to-day that have remained in a comparatively primitive stage of civilization.[1] Men in this stage are like children in conceiving God as an object among other objects. The polytheistic religions of the ancient world, the highest of which was that of Greece, and the religions of uncivilized peoples to-day are treated as illustrations of objective religion.

The subjective stage is that which corresponds to the stage of adolescence in the individual. God is conceived as like the inner principle in man. Certain races reached this stage early, and passed on to the next stage, while others have remained in it, and some

[1] I, p. 53, line 25.

have never reached it at all. The religions chosen to illustrate this are Buddhism, Stoicism, and Judaism.

The last stage in the evolution of religion would correspond to fullgrown manhood. This is the synthesis of the first two stages. God is seen as the principle uniting object and subject, and Christianity is the only religion that can claim to be this final and absolute religion. Jesus was the first to see that God is the principle of union, and the first to express this great truth in the form of a great maxim of life. He realized that evil is only good in the making, and taught that God and man are here and now reconciled. His martyr death gave greater weight to his teaching, and caused many to weave into their recollections of him fancies that really did not belong there. Paul, realizing the value of the principle laid down by Jesus, drew a picture of a person whose life, and above all whose death, illustrated this principle. John, starting where Paul left off, portrayed an ideal man whose life, more than his death should illustrate Christ's teaching.

But although Christianity succeeded in making the synthesis of objective and subjective religion, it is not yet in a state of equilibrium. It must repeat in itself all the previous movements in the evolution of religion. In the age preceding the Reformation, it was largely objective; and since the Reformation, largely subjective, and the end is not yet. If we think of a small light car being attached to a large, rapidly moving railway train, — at first not on the track, but later as getting on the track, we have an imperfect picture of this movement. At first, the small car bounds back and forth from one side to the other. After getting on to the track, it still sways to and fro, but remains on the track. Objective religion is the little car on one side, but not yet on the track. Subjective religion is the car on the other side at a point further down and nearer the track. Christianity is the car on the track, but still swaying very much, — at times appearing even to leave the track, though this is only appearance.

Dr. Caird, taking a slightly different viewpoint, says the main stages in the evolution of religion may be described as polytheism, pantheism, and monotheism. Monotheism always arises after the other two, and in opposition to them both[1]. These great stages embrace

[1] I, p. 41.

smaller stages within themselves. It almost seems, at times, as if Dr. Caird would say that objective religion conceives God as immanent in the world; subjective religion conceives him as transcendent; and the absolute religion conceives him as immanent and transcendent. Perhaps it would be a little nearer to his view to say that in objective religion, God is immanent in nature, but transcends man; in subjective religion, he transcends nature, but is immanent in man; in absolute religion, he is both immanent and transcendent in both nature and man.

II.

DEFINITION AND EXPLANATION OF THE TERMS USED.

In order to prevent misunderstanding, it is necessary to define, explain, and illustrate some of the terms already used. Much needless discussion might be saved, if it were only realized that men do not always use the same words alike.

1. Religion.

Our author readily admits that it is hard to define religion. There are so many and such varied phenomena classed as religious and in such different stages of development, that it is hard to find a quality common to all.[1] There are even some religions in which it is difficult to find any traces of a belief in a future life, and the ideas of the god or gods worshiped and of the relation between the divine and the human vary greatly in different religions. About the only thing they have in common is that they give a certain unity to life that would otherwise not be there. But Dr. Caird offers to spare us the pains of seeking for a trait common to all. This would serve his purpose very little. We are not to be told what religion is, but the principle which produces religion is to be given to us. This principle may manifest itself at first as a belief in ghosts, but this does not signify that religion is an illusion any more than the first efforts of the alchemists would prove that the science of chemistry is a mere collection of fancies.[2] We are told that various religions are

[1] I, pp. 31 and 40.
[2] I, p. 48 seq.

in various stages of development, and are related to each other as bud, flower, and fruit.[1] It would be useless to ask what is common to these. However, Dr. Caird gives such a description of the principle of religion that it serves very well as a definition of religion.

Religion is the expression of man's ultimate attitude to the universe. "It is the highest form of his consciousness of himself in his relation to all other things and beings."[2] It involves a conscious relation to a being or beings designated as divine.[3] Religions vary according to the changing relations between two constant terms, God and man, "each of which is conceived as essentially distinguished from, and essentially related to, the other, — God, as manifesting himself *to* and *in* man, and man as consciously seeking by acts of worship, by prayer or sacrifice or self-surrender, to establish or maintain harmonious relations between himself and his God or gods."[4] After comparing all he has said on the subject, we might frame a definition of religion that Dr. Caird would accept as follows: Religion is the consciousness of an ultimate principle of unity.[5] Man is one with this principle, though he is not fully awake to the realization of this fact until taught it by the highest form of religion, namely, Christianity.[6] By principle, Dr. Caird means a universal law.[7] Hence we know God in the same sense that we know the law of gravitation. The main difference between scientific knowledge and religious knowledge is that in religion we are conscious of a higher law than any of the laws of nature.[8] And since the idea of self and not-self are subordinate ideas to the idea of God,[9] the more we know of self and of the world in which we live, the more we know of God. And we are religious just in proportion as we have knowledge.[10] With a view to make the true idea of religion clearer, Dr. Caird criticizes the views of Prof.

[1] I, p. 40. Cf. also p. 177.
[2] I, p. 30 seq.
[3] I, p. 53.
[4] I, p. 55.
[5] Cf. I, pp. 98, 124, 195, 201, 205; II, p. 61 seq.
[6] II, p. 232.
[7] II, p. 255.
[8] I, pp. 110, 111, and 112.
[9] I, p. 163.
[10] I, p. 136.

Max Müller and Mr. Spencer on this subject. Prof. Max Müller says the essence of religion is the consciousness that there is an infinite beyond all that we know as finite. He forgets that infinity must include even this little world we call the finite world. Prof. Max Müller does not mean that religion has always had this idea of the infinite *explicitly,* but says it was always there *implicitly.* Dr. Caird says this does not give what is common to all religions, nor is it the principle which produced religion.[1] According to Mr. Spencer's view, religion is a certain consciousness of the existence of an infinite, which makes it impossible to doubt its reality, but nothing can ever be known of it except that it exists. According to this view of Mr. Spencer, the highest wisdom in religious matters is to learn to dispense with what is usually called religion.[2] Dr. Caird is not willing to admit that we can know nothing more of the infinite than that it exists. He is willing to admit that the definitions of Prof. Max Müller or of Mr. Spencer may be true of religion at some stage, but considers they are one-sided and imperfect because they do not define religion in its final stage.[3] In this stage, religion is the faith that regards the things of time and sense as nothing in themselves, but as elements through which God manifests and realizes himself.[4]

2. God.

But Dr. Caird not only differs from Prof. Max Müller and Mr. Spencer as to what the relation between man and the infinite is, but as to what the correct idea of the infinite is. According to Dr. Caird, the true way to think of God is to think of him as the principle of unity that transcends and unites all differences, even the difference between self and not-self.[5] According to Prof. Max Müller, the true idea of God is that he is something beyond all we can grasp in sensuous perception and imagination. We know the finite and from our standpoint there, we say God is *not* what the finite is. Mr. Spencer looks at things from the standpoint of the infinite, and says

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[1] I, pp. 89—90.
[2] I, p. 92 seq.; cf. also 135 and 220.
[3] I, p. 91, foot-note.
[4] I, pp. 112 and 113.
[5] Cf. I, 97, 165, 185, 195; II, p. 143.

the finite is *not* what the infinite is. He says the infinite is the unconditioned, unlimited, and though we know nothing of it but that it exists, it is the presupposition of all our knowledge.[1]

Dr. Caird puts forth as clearer and more adequate his own idea that God is a unifying principle that unites all differences and is limited by nothing but himself. Prof. Max Müller made the infinite limit the finite; Mr. Spencer made the finite limit the infinite. Dr. Caird does not want to give up the individuality of God.[2] He seeks to combine pantheism and monotheism, though he does not make it clear exactly what he means by these terms.[3] God manifests himself in matter and spirit alike, but more in spirit than matter. Dr. Caird believes that the progress of enlightenment has made it impossible to accept any other idea of deity than the one he advocates.[4] God is an individual, and yet all things manifest him and in all things he is realizing himself. One would think from all this that it would be impossible to doubt the existence of God, since the consciousness of self and of not-self are elements of the consciousness of God. But our author admits that this is possible and tries to explain it by saying that those who doubt God's existence have their idea of God so widened by growing knowledge that they cannot easily satisfy themselves with the imperfect ways of defining, describing, or representing him which the greatest thinkers are able to produce.[5]

3. Subject and Object.

It is impossible to understand Dr. Caird's thought without understanding the meaning which he attaches to the words *subject* and *object*. The terms occur very often in the discussion. He says the *object* "is the general name under which we include the external world and all the things and beings in it, all that we know and all that we act on, the whole environment, which conditions the activity of the ego and furnishes the means and the sphere in which it realizes itself."[6] All that is classed as belonging to the objective world is to

[1] I, pp. 92 and 114 seq.
[2] I, p. 112.
[3] II, p. 63, foot-note, and p. 82.
[4] I, p. 63.
[5] I, p. 137.
[6] I, p. 64 seq.

be regarded as a unity. The *subject* is the self that feels itself distinct from the objective world, and regards itself as a unity. The object exists for and in relation to the subject, and the subject exists only in opposition to the object.[1] An *inside* implies an *outside,* and *vice versa.* We cannot have a stick with one end only. The difference between subject and object is the fundamental difference that underlies all other differences except, possibly, the difference between God and subject, and God and object.[2] The subject could not be conscious of itself except in opposition to an object, and when turned back on itself, loses all content.[3] Although subject and object are opposed to each other, there is a sense in which they are to be considered one, though the subjective is superior to the objective.[4] Dr. Caird calls object and subject two modes of the infinite, and would use these terms where Spinoza used the terms *thought* and *extension.*[5] Again, it is interesting and important to note that he uses the following terms as having essentially the same content as *subject* and *object:* inner and outer experience;[6] being and knowing;[7] ideal and real;[8] spiritual and natural;[9] theoretical and practical. Dr. Caird would liken the relation of object, subject, and God, to a crystal sphere which conditions all within it, and limits all, but is itself liable to be overlooked because it is transparent.[10]

4. Evolution.

There is still another term used often in the discussion, which it is necessary to understand if we would grasp the thread of Dr. Caird's reasoning, and that it the word *evolution.* "The favorite idea of classical antiquity was not the idea of progress, but the idea of a cycle of changes in which departure *from* the original unity and return *to* it, or, as we should say, differentiation and

[1] I, pp. 127, 325, 360.
[2] I, p. 117.
[3] I, pp. 130, 133, 236, 366 seq.
[4] I, p. 186. Cf. also II, p. 142.
[5] I, pp. 104, 118.
[6] I, p. 124.
[7] I, p. 69.
[8] I, p. 366.
[9] II, p. 142.
[10] I, p. 67. Used by Aristotle.

integration, are not united, but follow each other."[1] But we are told that the idea of development has been gradually gaining ground since the beginning of the Christian era. Dr. Caird uses the words *evolution* and *development* interchangeably.

In thinking of evolution, we are always to think of that which evolves, — even humanity — as an organism, a unity that preserves its identity and manifests its principle in all its parts successively. There is a sense in which what is evolving never changes, and a sense in which all is change.[2] The process is to be read backwards. We are not able to tell what sort of a flower will come from a certain seed until we see the flower. But after we have seen the highest and last stage in the evolution, we get a better understanding of this stage itself in tracing the steps through which it came. And when we look at what is now the highest stage in the evolution, we feel sure that a still higher development will come, though we are unable to forecast it very accurately.[3] What is first is not the cause of what follows, though, in a sense, the higher grows out of the lower. It is not the bud which causes the fruit, but a principle of life acted on by a certain environment.[4] But each stage in the evolution is absolutely necessary and equally necessary. It would be impossible to have the fruit without the bud.[5] It follows from what has been said that there can be no catastrophes or revolutions in evolution. This would be to leave out some of the necessary stages, — to pass from the seed to the fruit without the bud. It may seem to be otherwise in some cases, but that is only because the even and steady steps of progress have been concealed from view.[6] Again, the higher *must* follow upon the lower. If one stage is entered upon, and supposing, of course, the environment to be favorable, the next stage must follow. If a bud is there, and no unfavorable environment destroys it, the fruit must come.[7] This may suffice as a brief ex-

[1] I, p. 21.
[2] I, p. 24 seq.; 171.
[3] I, pp. 43, 45; II, p. 225.
[4] I, pp. 45, 47.
[5] II, p. 267.
[6] I, pp. 181, 182, 199; II, p. 235.
[7] Cf. I, p. 38, and II, p. 42.

planation of the terms used in Dr. Caird's statement of the problem to be solved and of the solution offered.

He would call his philosophy idealism (idealism to be understood as the doctrine that the ultimate explanation of the world is to be found in a rational principle kindred to the soul of man).[1] It would be more correct to call it idealistic pantheism. He starts with an optimistic outlook, but seems to grow pessimistic, toward the end of his survey, as to the real progress of the evolution, and finds great difficulty in explaining the slowness of the evolution, and how it is that so few characters as great as Paul or Jesus have ever arisen. He says our minds are overshadowed by a sense of the slowness of our progress toward the goal we anticipate. "We may perhaps persuade ourselves that it is the result to which the whole movement of the time is pointing; but to us, to whom 'one day' is *not* 'as a thousand years' it seems to come so slowly that we are tempted to doubt whether it comes at all, whether it is not altogether an illusion. We may be advancing towards a higher comprehension of the ideal meaning of the world and human life. But how crude, it will be said, how crude and discordant are the voices of most of those who claim to speak for modern science and philosophy; and how abstract and vague is the utterance even of the best religious and ethical thought of our time, as it expresses itself in our greatest poets and thinkers. Where is there anything like the passionate and triumphant spiritualism of St. Paul, or the simple penetrating intuition of Jesus, that saw good through evil, and a divine purpose realizing itself in all the confusions of human life? Where is the poet who rises high enough in his song to unite the feelings and desires and hopes of our time with the divine, as the Hebrew psalmist was able to unite them for his time; or the philosopher who can combine a thorough grasp of the facts of experience, as they have been analysed by modern science, with the idealism that 'sees all things in God'? And, on the other hand, when we turn to the practical life, where is the religious zeal whose heat is not hostile to light, or the enlightenment whose intelligence has not paralysed its will? Where is the practical Christianity, which can go beyond the beaten round of the religious life of the

[1] I, p. 319; II, pp. 82 seq. and 319 seq.

past to cope with all the unsolved problems of the present, without losing itself in anarchy, revolt, and nihilism; or in vague socialistic schemes which, even if they could succeed, would satisfy only the hunger of the body? And, indeed, no one can say that the ideal of such a theoretical and such a practical life has yet been realised, even in the sense and to the degree in which the ideals of the past have been realised."[1] These are pessimistic words indeed, and may serve well as an introduction to the examination of the sources and validity of what Dr. Caird has given as his contribution towards solving the problem of religion.

III.
CRITICISM.

1. Caird and Hegel.

The main influences that helped to determine the make-up of Dr. Caird's philosophy are Kant, Comte, Spencer, Scotch Christianity, and especially Hegel. He starts with Kant's doctrine that the external world can only be understood in relation to the unity of the self within.[2] With Comte and Spencer, he conceives of humanity as an organism. And his subjective stage in religion reminds one of Comte's metaphysical stage in the development of humanity. It is probably the influence of Scotch Christianity that makes him seek to hold on to the personality of God, and refuse to admit that he is revealed in everything in the same degree. To this also is due his unwillingness to minimize the deadly nature of evil, as well as his respect for the Bible. But Dr. Caird himself would readily acknowledge that he owes more to Hegel than to any other philosopher. He believes that Hegel "has subjected the idea of evolution to a more penetrating analysis than it had ever before received, and applied it with wonderful insight and grasp to the political, the artistic, the religious, and the philosophical life of man."[3] He thinks, however, that Hegel raised the cry of triumph a little too soon when he asserted that no power in the

[1] II, p. 322 seq.
[2] II, p. 319.
[3] I, p. 24.

universe could offer any resistance to science.[1] He quotes with approval Hegel's introduction to his philosophy of religion in which he says that it is religion that gives dignity and peace to the life of man by lifting him to a height from which he can look down with repose on the little, finite things of the world, seeing them dissolved in the infinite.[2] He acknowledges that he follows in a way Hegel's interpretation of the Greek religion, of Judaism, and the middle ages.[3] In some of his other works, Dr. Caird expresses more clearly than here his adherence to Hegel's views. In his article on Metaphysic in the *Encyclopaedia Britanica,* he practically identifies Hegelianism and Christianity. He says that Hegel's idealism "has a close relation to Christianity; it may be even said to be but Christianity theorized. It has often been asserted that Hegel's philosophy of religion is but an artificial accommodation to Christian doctrine of a philosophy which has no inherent relation to Christianity. If, however, we regard the actual development of that philosophy, it would be truer to say that it was the study of Christian ideas that first produced it."[4] He is willing to admit, however, that Hegel's method cannot be applied exactly as he applied it, and does not hesitate to say that in the hands of a skilful manipulator, it could be made to seem to prove anything.[5] But Dr. Caird hardly needs to tell us of his admiration for Hegel. The ever-repeated, monotonous rule of three, — the thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, — would indicate it to one who had only a slight acquaintance with Hegel's views. It is not with injustice that Dr. Caird has been called the leader of the Anglo-Hegelian school of philosophy. Some of the points in which Caird and Hegel can be said to agree may be here summed up.

They are both obscure on many important points. Every student of philosophy has heard that Hegel said, — "Only one man has understood me, and even he has not." And often when one thinks he understands Dr. Caird, he finds he has not. Hegel is very abstract,

[1] I, p. 4.
[2] I, p. 82.
[3] I, pp. 281, 282, 385.
[4] *Encyclopaedia Britanica,* 9th edition, vol. XVI, article on Metaphysic, p. 102.
[5] Ibid.

though he gives many interesting illustrations in his treatment of some of the stages of religion.[1] Dr. Caird is also abstract, but he is not so much so as Hegel. However, he gives us fewer illustrations of what he means.

They both agree in looking at things from an intellectual standpoint, and in their confidence in the powers of intellect. Hegel put philosophy higher than religion, and finds in it man's ultimate attitude toward the universe. Dr. Caird says religion occupies this position, but in reality there is little difference between the two, for the absolute religion of Dr. Caird is really a philosophy and not a religion. He seems at times even to make room for the inference that what he calls religion will disappear and something higher, — probably a philosophy — will take its place.[2]

The fundamental metaphysical principles that underly this work of Dr. Caird's seem to be essentially those laid down in Hegel's *Logic*. The *thing in itself* of Kant is not regarded as real in the sense that it is something apart from the reason that thinks it. There is really no essential difference between matter and spirit, because both are manifestations of God. We are not to think of anything commonly called finite, such as the animal kingdom, as evolving by the action and interaction of a life within and an environment without, distinct from and different from the thing which is evolving. The so-called finite thing and its so-called environment are both evolving because they are manifestations of God who is evolving. The difference between matter and spirit is the difference rather between different stages in God's evolution. Dr. Caird's thought might be illustrated by charcoal, graphite, and diamond, which are all carbon. If one could imagine a large lump of carbon, the larger part of which is charcoal, a small part graphite, and a still smaller part diamond, and then if one imagines this lump to begin to transform, so that the charcoal passes over into graphite and the graphite into diamond until finally the whole lump is diamond, one would have an imperfect illustration of this conception of the universe. It will thus be seen that Dr. Caird and Hegel are in substantial agreement in their doctrine of idealism, of identity, and of evolution. Neither of them seeks

[1] Cf. his treatment of the *Naturreligionen, Werke,* Band 11, pp. 219—376

[2] I, p. 63.

primarily to show the causes of things, but their conception of the task of philosophy is that it should arrange all things in the universe in a series, — in other words, to describe the process in the evolution of God. To know things is primarily to know their history. Neither of them is able to set up ideals toward which we are to strive in the future. From all this it necessarily follows that both believe that the more man knows of himself and of nature, the more he knows of God. Both have the three elements in their system when they consider the whole evolution from a religious standpoint, — God, self, not-self, and various religions are grouped around these ideas. They would not agree as to the details of the application of this method, however. Both are optimists, for if God is evolving and all that is a manifestation of God, it will surely have a happy end. Dr. Caird believes in an "optimism on the basis of pessimism," — an expression often quoted from him since.[1] Again there is no essential difference in the dialectical method as employed by Hegel (though he was not the first to use it) and by Dr. Caird. Dr. Caird, however, does not carry the process so far. He has one great thesis, then an antithesis, followed by their synthesis. These great divisions are not subdivided, and again subdivided as in Hegel.

They both agree in putting nature below spirit. They both agree in saying a *belief* in miracles was necessary at a certain stage in the evolution of religion, and both forget to tell us whether miracles did happen, though their systems leave no room for miracles in the usually accepted sense of the term. They both agree in general in their interpretation of the religion of Egypt, and both call Judaism the religion of sublimity, though Hegel puts the religion of the Greeks higher than that of the Jews, while Dr. Caird sees in Judaism a higher form of religion than Hellenism. But both are more imbued with the spirit of the Greek religion than with that of Judaism or Christianity. Dr. Caird later worked out more fully his ideas on the evolution of religion in the Greek philosophers for the Gifford lectures which he was chosen a second time to deliver.[2]

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[1] I, p. 85, in summary of the lecture at the beginning and seq.

[2] *The Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers,* the Gifford lectures of 1900-1 and 1901-2, 2 vols., Glasgow, 1904.

The principal points of difference grow out of the fact that Caird lived after historical criticism had been more fully developed, and after Darwin and others had made a more thorough application of evolution to science. Dr. Caird is more careful in his use of illustrations drawn from the beliefs and practices of uncivilized peoples than Hegel, for investigation has shown that many old notions as to the ideas of the savage must be revised. And of course some of the difference between the two is due to their different theological standpoint.

With all of his admiration for Hegel, Dr. Caird is not merely a slavish pupil. He has thought through the system and has given expression to it in his own way. Although he has brought no great new idea that was not involved in Hegel's philosophy, he has helped to make Hegel popular in England and has made it easier to see the application of his ideas to modern problems. He is not a reviser of Hegel, but has absorbed his spirit and has expressed Hegelian ideas in Cairdian terms

2. Objections to Dr. Caird's Views.

It will be convenient here to show some of the weak points in Dr. Caird's theories, and this can best be done by grouping the criticisms around the terms defined and explained above, and in the same order.

a *Religion.* Dr. Caird rightly says that it is difficult to define religion. But it is necessary to separate sharply in thinking the phenomena to be considered from all others. This he fails to do. He confuses religion and philosophy. But from the standpoint assumed,[1] viz., that the absolute religion is the one that reveals the true nature of religion, and assuming Christianity to be the absolute religion, one would expect some such definition as that religion is a life in harmony with the true God. Being a *life,* it would involve more than mere intellect, or feeling, or will, though if the pre-eminence is to be given to anything, it must be given to feeling since the founder of Christianity and his apostles made love to God the center of all their system. One can hardly help wondering, however, just how Dr. Caird hit on Christianity

[1] Assuming as he does that Christianity is the highest form of religion, Dr. Caird can hardly be said to be as free from bias as Johnstone thinks. Cf. his *Dissertation,* p. 45.

as the final and absolute form of religion. It has had to repeat in itself all the stages the others passed through. It had a stage when it was objective to a high degree; then a stage wherein it was correspondingly subjective, and is not now as nicely balanced as Dr. Caird would like to have it. The same method would make any religion the absolute religion. Why not call Mohammedanism the absolute religion? In a measure it grew out of Judaism and Christianity. It is later than Christianity in origin, and has shown at times various tendencies that can be described as objective and subjective, and is not yet absolutely fixed.

If religion is a life, or something that involves the whole of man, it could hardly be called a process of knowing, which Dr. Caird makes it, or a mere phase in the development of consciousness. In all this, confusion is worse confounded when we remember that according to Caird's view, religion must be merely God's own self-consciousness. The worship of God is merely God worshipping himself. Who but a philosopher with supreme confidence in the powers of his intellect would ever think of saying that knowing God and knowing a law in physics are fundamentally the same? Or that the more psychology and logic, or physics and chemistry one knows, the more religious he is? This is rather discouraging to the man of little or no education, or training in philosophy. Dr. Caird seems to say that this poor ignorant man can only be religious when he believes that subject and object, or spirit and matter are not what he thought they were, but are a part of God. And if religion is knowledge, the older a man is, the more religious he must be! Dr. Caird could not say simply he ought to be so, but by virtue of the fact that religion is knowledge and is present most where consciousness has reached its highest stage, all old men must be very religious!

b *God.* Dr. Caird's conception of God is pantheistic. It is true he seeks to guard himself from falling into bald pantheism, but he certainly has not done anything to make it easier to think a union of pantheism and monotheism, for monotheism denies that God is in any sense identical with man or nature, and asserts that God is transcendent. He has scarcely touched the problem of personality at all. Is God a personality, independent of men and all finite things,

with no necessity to create, and with a consciousness and self-consciousness all his own? One looks in vain for a satisfactory answer to this question. To Caird, God is rather a principle. However, he speaks of the living God, and even uses language at times that seems to make it necessary to regard God as a subject among other subjects. But if God were a subject, according to Caird, he would have to be transcended by something higher. He does not make it clear whether God requires a not-self to be God or not. If so, he must have had some not-self with him eternally. Was this matter, and is matter eternal? One would expect Dr. Caird to show how the trinity may help us out of the difficulty. But he has as good as nothing to say of the trinity.

All the usual objections to pantheism will apply to Dr. Caird's idea of God. It is full of contradictions. God is absolute, and yet necessarily revealing himself, and seems to be eternally working good out of evil. He is perfect, but must evolve. The validity of the idea of God seems to be made to depend on the validity of the distinction of self and not-self, and yet these are essentially identical. Dr. Caird's idea of God also contradicts our own deepest intuitive judgments. There is a notion that stubbornly persists in the minds of all men, that there is no real sense in which God, man, and nature are identical in substance. Men feel they are distinct from nature, distinct from even the nearest friends who influence them most, and distinct from the God they believe in. If the success of the absolute religion means getting this notion out of the minds of men, it will never succeed. Again, this theory does violence to deep-seated ideas of morality and right and freedom. It is very difficult to understand what Dr. Caird has to say about the freedom of the will.[1] But we cannot admit that evil is only good in the making, or imperfect good. Judas was not simply an undeveloped St. Paul. According to Dr. Caird, Judas might even be considered a Jesus Christ in the making.

If God is to be thought of as realizing himself in nature and man, was he conscious before he revealed himself in nature? It would almost seem as though Dr. Caird thinks of God as having been at one time unconscious. If God was originally unconscious, how

[1] I, p. 167.

could he ever reveal himself in a self-conscious spirit? It would seem that in speaking of God, Dr. Caird is unconsciously led astray by a spatial metaphor. If God were infinite in space, and if the spirit of man could be thought of as occupying so much space, then of course man is a part of God.

c *Subject and Object.* One can hardly help wishing that Dr. Caird had been a little clearer and fuller in his treatment of these ideas. What does he mean by subject and object? It would seem that in his insistence that a subject must always have an object, he makes a conscious existence apart form material surroundings or apart from the body impossible.[1] And *subject* and *object* seem to be used in different places with different meanings. How does it happen that object is the same as nature? If object is everything that is *not-self,* then other spirits of other men and even God belong in the objective world of any given individual. This individual in turn is a part of the objective world of other individuals so that an individual is subject and object at the same time. Why may not any individual be considered the synthesis of object and subject?

Again, to classify all religions as to their objectivity or subjectivity or the measure in which they combine the two is arbitrary and cannot be a good principle of division. No exact classification can be made on this principle. Subjective things are too subjective to be thus classified. It is as if one were to classify the pictures in an art gallery as most beautiful, least beautiful, and mediumly beautiful. It would be hard to find any two persons who would agree as to which pictures should be in which groups. Such a principle could never serve as a scientific basis of classification.[2] Again, it is doubtful whether all other divisions can be subsumed under one or the other of these two heads. This division of the universe into object, subject and synthesis of the two, rests on the Hegelian idea that everything great or small can always be profitably considered from these three standpoints. It is possible however to find two view-points so

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[1] Cf. I, p. 183 seq.

[2] Johnstone's admiration for his old teacher seems to have hindered him from seeing this. He even says Dr. Caird's treatment of religion is strictly scientific ("streng wissenschaftlich"). *Dissertation,* p. 48.

diametrically opposed that there is no third higher point from which they can be regarded as a unity. It would seem that matter and spirit, good and evil, God and man, are thus related. Philosophy has failed so far to reveal any such view-point. Dr. Caird creates as many or more difficulties than he solves. How, for example, can God manifest himself in subject and object alike, and yet more in subject than in object? To whom does he manifest himself? If the manifestation is alike in both cases, how is it different? If the quality of the manifestation is the same, it must be different as to the quantity. Is it to be thought of as different in the time it endures, or in the space it occupies?

Again, it may be questioned whether consciousness develops in the order assumed, either in the individual, or in the race. Many individuals can be found who though willing to admit that they were first conscious of nature around them, assert that they were next conscious of God and were troubled with great deep problems about God and his nature before they were conscious of themselves, or began to reason about their own reasoning. And even if the consciousness of the individuel develops in this order, it is not so easy to see why the development of religion should be just so. It would rather seem that each individual's religion would be objective, subjective, or synthetic according to the stage in life he had reached, and the way to tell whether religion to-day is more objective than subjective would be to take a census and see whether the individuals who are in the one stage or the other predominate. One might write a history of the evolution of painting in the same general way Dr. Caird has treated the evolution of religion. We notice that a child is first more attracted by a spectral red color than any other. Later he prefers green-blue. Then, when grown up, admires most of all pure white, the synthesis of these complementary colors. Consequently the pictures men first painted were predominantly red. Later they were green-blue. We are still in this stage for we admire the blue in a Murillo's madonna. But we are entering upon the final stage of art where there will be much white with now a little blue and then a little red, until these disappear entirely. Of course, painting itself would disappear, but we must hold fast to our theory.

We do not need to observe men to see whether the admiration for colors develops in this order, nor whether the development of painting has gone this way. We have assumed this to be true, and by carefully choosing our illustrations, we can prove that it is so.

It is difficult to see why some religions are characterized as more subjective than objective, or to see why certain qualities of the religions considered are more objective than subjective. For instance, one of the characteristics of subjective religion is that the ideal is opposed to the real, and in a sense is conceived to have a higher reality.[1] Then Christianity from apostolic times until the Reformation is called objective, though in this period comes Gnosticism, Asceticism, Platonic Philosophy, Scholasticism, and Chiliasm.[2] Did not the ideal play an important part here? Again, the period after the Reformation is said to be predominantly subjective because more like Judaism as described by Dr. Caird. This may be true of Calvinism at certain stages, and in certain countries as in Scotland, but is not true of post-Reformation Christianity as a whole. One might as well say that Christianity before the Reformation was decidedly subjective, and very much like Judaism, but that since then, it has been practically in the synthetic stage. Upon the whole, it does not seem that this classification of religions as objective, subjective, and synthetic is a fortunate one. Is an objective religion one that conceives of God as manifested in, or dwelling in a natural object, — say in a mountain, or in a lower animal? But the savage does not always *identify* God with the natural object. The natural object is thought to have some quality different from other similar natural objects not used in worship. And all religions have their priests, medicine men, or special adepts who are looked upon as having special power over the god, or as understanding better than others how he is to be approached. Ancestor worship plays a big part in many polytheistic religions. Are not these things subjective? May it not be true that polytheistic religions are just as subjective as objective? Is subjective religion one that conceives of God as manifesting himself in the soul of man? Is the conscience considered to be the voice of God? But does this imply

[1] Cf. I, p. 329 seq.
[2] II, p. 268 seq.

that God is not thought of as manifesting himself in nature as well? When one reads some of the things Dr. Caird says of subjective religion, he is tempted to say this is absolute religion.

Once more, he does not stick consistently to the principle according to which he proposed in the beginning to classify religions. He seems now to classify them according to one principle, and now according to another. Again, he seeks to show that the most varied characteristics which he finds in any one religion are mere expressions of the fundamental principle assumed. It is as if one were to start in to classify the books of a library according to their contents, and were to arrange one section according to this principle and then arrange another according to the color of the bindings, and still another according to the size of the books, and then in defence of this procedure were to seek to show that classifying books according to color and size is the same in essence as classifying according to contents. We had been told that the main stages in the evolution of religion are clear, viz., polytheism, pantheism, and monotheism[1], and that these stages will follow each other in this order if national existence is preserved long enough.[2] We are not told why national existence is not preserved in some cases. We would like to know more about the connection between religion and national life, — especially in nations that have perished. Was the fall of the nation in any way attributable to the fact that the religion was inadequate to its needs? Again, it is not made clear whether polytheism, pantheism, monotheism coincide with objective, subjective, absolute.

d *Evolution.* Concerning Dr. Caird's idea of evolution, it may be remarked that his statement of the doctrine has not made it any clearer. It would seem that to distinguish between *development* and *evolution* would have conduced to clearness. It would be better to keep the term development for the unfolding in each individual of the powers within, and evolution for the series of changes in which *new* powers, organs, organs, or functions arise. The growth of a boy's muscles from boyhood to manhood should not be called the evolution of his muscles. But if one of his grandchildren shows a muscle that

[1] I, p. 41.
[2] II, p. 4.

none of his ancestors had, this should be called evolution. The changes that take place in any particular animal from the moment of conception until death are its development. But if when we compare the ancestors and descendants of this individual animal, we discover that some new trait has arisen, this thould be called evolution. Development in biology would compare the individual with itself. Evolution would compare the individual with its ancestors and descendants. One religion develops, but a new religion is evolved. It may be a manifestation of the same life principle as Dr. Caird would say, but these are different ways of looking at it, and it would help to keep them separate.

There are some ideas in biological evolution that Dr. Caird seems to have overlooked. There is now a respectable number of investigators who deny that acquired changes in an individual animal are transmitted. If an animal shows an important trait different from its ancestors, it is more probable that the descendants will not show it than that they will. If this should become more clear as investigation proceeds, the whole theory of biological evolution will have to be reconstructed.

Again, Dr. Caird ignores the fact that biological evolution is not always in one line, but in many cases in diverging lines, and that the highest forms of life *do not sum up all the stages of evolution.* May we not say that religion has evolved along diverging lines instead of in one line? In this case, Buddhism may come from Brahminism, pantheism may come from polytheism, and Christianity may be the highest form of the one supernatural religion of which Judaism is an earlier form. However one applies this idea of diverging evolution, it would certainly yield different results from those Dr. Caird has reached.

When Dr. Caird speaks of the evolution of humanity as an organism, he seems to mean this in a real sense, and not that humanity may be compared to an organism by analogy.[1] But it is difficult to see how we may speak of humanity as an organism except by way of analogy. Analogy is a similarity of *relations,* and not a similarity of the things compared. Knowledge enlightens the mind as light reveals things to the eye, but knowledge is not essentially similar to

[1] This he denies in his essay on Comte's philosophy. But his language is certainly often misleading.

light. Neither is the eye essentially like the mind. Nothing can be learned as to the nature of knowledge or the workings of mind by a study of light or of the eye. An understanding of the laws of light and of the structure of the eye may illustrate what we have already learned from other sources as to how the mind acquires knowledge, and may enable us to make our thoughts clear to others. But analogizing does not increase knowledge. If humanity is an organism, it must be a higher organism than any we know of in the animal kingdom. Hence it must have some organs so much higher than other organisms that it would be difficult to describe them in biological terms. Dr. Caird gives us no hint as to what groups of humanity correspond to certain organs.

If Dr. Caird's ideas of evolution have been correctly set forth, of course there is no room for miracles or a divine revelation in the sense in which these terms are commonly taken. A miracle would be a catastrophe too great to harmonize with the evolutionary hypothesis. It is noteworthy that Dr. Caird admits there are things that look like catastrophes. It is very hard to see how certain fruits have come from certain seeds by a gradual process. The bud is not to be found. To assume that it is there is a mere matter of hypothesis in some cases. In fact, there is just about as much ground for assuming that it was not there as that it was. Dr. Caird seems to have fallen into the error against which he has warned us, of forgetting that the difference between certain things is qualitative and not merely quantitative. There are certainly several missing links between such a religion as Buddhism in India and Judaic monotheism. Dr. Caird seems willing to admit that there was a time when a belief in miracles was all but a necessity. But he fails to tell us what awoke in many great minds a belief that miracles had taken place. There were men of keen intellect in the time of Christ and Paul and afterwards who sought to disprove the fact of miracles, but the belief that Christ had actually risen from the dead persisted, and even to-day the number of great minds that believe this is by no means a negligible quantity. We do not want a discussion of the ignorance and superstition of the world in the past that needed miracles as a support to faith so much as we want a discussion of the miracles themselves. Did they occur? Surely a

philosopher who quietly assumes they did not, should explain how it is that men believe they did.

Again, the facts do not give one much warrant for believing that the principle of religion after having manifested itself as pantheism, evolved into a monotheism and into Christianity without a revelation in the usual theological sense of that term. Where has a pantheism ever evolved into a monotheism after having been polytheistic? Was Judaism ever pantheistic? Dr. Caird himself does not even hint that there was any tendency toward pantheism in the religion of the Jews. Is not this like the skipping of a link in evolution? Dr. Caird admits that Judaism was far superior to any religion of antiquity. Why not admit the explanation of this fact given by this religion itself. To illustrate this, let us suppose a party of strangers separated from their guides in the great Mammoth Cave of Kentucky. They have no light, and no means of producing one. We may suppose there are finger-boards everywhere telling the way out, but they can scarcely distinguish the outlines of their own hands before them and of course cannot read. After being a long time in the darkness they can see a little, but when the limit of their ability to see is reached, they are still unable to read the finger-boards. They know there are streams and precipices near and so must proceed very slowly. They soon get separated from each other and are unable to get back together. The guides discovering that some of their party are lost, immediately set out to find the lost ones. After a long search, one man, almost perishing from hunger is found, and sent to the mouth of the cave. When the others are found, it is too late. In exhaustion and despair they have fallen into pits and over precipices and life is extinct. When the one man relates afterwards how the guides with the lights enabled him to find the way which he himself could not find, and when we know that the others who had no artificial light brought to them, remained in the cave, shall we not believe him? Dr. Caird's theory would make this man's eyes so develop in the darkness that he himself would be able to find his way out. But he knows that he could never have seen clearly enough to be certain enough of his way to get out without help from some source outside of himself before being utterly exhausted.

Dr. Caird's theory would make the eye of man unaided grow strong enough by and by to see the rings on Saturn and all the faintest and most distant stars. Revelation comes as a telescope and enables one to see more clearly what he already saw before, and also to see many things he never could have seen otherwise. Outside of Judaism, and the religions that have come in contact with it, there has never been a religion in historical times that clearly conceived, and firmly grasped and held the principles of monotheism.

Dr. Caird himself seems at times to almost make a place for revelation in his system. He speaks, for instance, of the savage who in passing from a stage where he is a slave to external nature to a period where self-consciousness arises, falls into a worse slavery to his own caprice. In this case he says the savage is much like every boy passing into adolescence. He then goes on to say the case is different with the young brought up under the influences of civilized society which forces upon them from without at an early age what otherwise would not have come till a much later stage of development.[1] He all but says here that civilization and religion can scarcely come to the savage at all unless brought to him from without by some one already in possession of these blessings. If bringing a savage into contact with civilization lifts him up faster than he could have lifted himself up, may it not be that the fact that Judaism became monotheistic so early was due to a divine revelation in a real sense as commonly believed by monotheistic Christianity, and not in the hazy, indefinite sense of pantheism?

Dr. Caird fails to make it clear just how what follows grows out of what precedes. He says the future does not grow out of the past, but uses language repeatedly that would lead one to think so.[2] He seems to mean that the bud does not produce the flower and the fruit, but that the life principle in the plant could not possibly show itself in fruit unless the bud were there, and environment being equal, results must be equal when the same principle has been at work the same length of time. And it is hard to grasp his idea of environment. If God is evolving and manifesting himself first in nature and later

[1] I, p. 178.
[2] Cf. I, p. 48 and II, p. 103.

in spirit, there is no environment. The thing evolving furnishes its own environment. But if one takes environment in the usual sense, what is there in the environment that hinders Buddhism in Japan or India from becoming a pure and noble monotheism? What conditions surrounding Buddhism made it a failure as a subjective religion and made it go back to objective religion and idol worship and succeed, — for apart from a few philosophic minds in Buddhistic countries that is what the masses did? If Dr. Caird would only consider environment in the evolution of religion, one would like to have him give a fair treatment of revelation as one of the factors in environment. But he makes too little of environment.

After all, the problem of religion is not as simple and easy as Dr. Caird seems at times to believe. He leaves us a great deal further from the final solution of all the difficulties than he imagines. There is probably some kind of evolution in religion and religious ideas, but just exactly the kind of evolution has not yet been fully determined.

3. Some of the Merits of the Treatise.

Many of the good things that can be said of Hegel, would of course apply to Dr. Caird. It is impossible to read a work like this, and ever have the same idea of the course of religious history afterwards. He has succeeded in many cases in giving the general characteristics of a religion as a whole when compared with other religions, and of a period of religious history when compared with other periods. In the study of details, this view-point is often neglected. When a scholar, familiar with all speculation as Dr. Caird undoubtedly is, attempts a work of this sort, there are sure to be many stimulating and suggestive passages. His opening lecture on the "Possibility of a Science of Religion" is full of such material. Dr. Caird has shown some of the weaknesses in other works on the subject of religion, and deserves our thanks for calling our attention anew to the old and important problem of religion. Even if this work as a whole can hardly be said to have accomplished what its author set out to do, it has accomplished much good and has shed some light on the problem.

Lebenslauf.

Ich, Walter Oliver Lewis, evangelischer Konfession, Bürger der Vereinigten Staaten Amerikas, wurde am 22. Februar 1877 in Gentry County als Sohn des Landwirtes Benjamin Lewis und seiner Ehefrau Laura, geb. Coffey, geboren. Meine erste Ausbildung erhielt ich in den öffentlichen Schulen meiner Heimat, und in der High School und Normal School in Stanberry, unweit meines Geburtsortes. Im Jahre 1893 bezog ich das William Jewell College, zu Liberty, Missouri, welches ich im Frühjahr 1898 mit dem Baccalaureus verließ. Im selben Jahre wurde ich als Geistlicher ordiniert und wurde darauf Hilfsprediger auf einer Missions-Station in St. Louis, Missouri, welche Stellung ich drei Jahre innehatte. Im Herbst 1901 fand ich Aufnahme als theologischer Student in dem Southern Baptist Theological Seminary in Louisville, Kentucky. Nach drei Jahren daselbst wurde ich Pastor der Wyatt Park Baptist Church in St. Joseph, Missouri, und im Juni 1906 erwarb ich in dem vorhergenannten William Jewell College den Magister. Das Winter-Semester 1906—7 studierte ich in der Universität zu Berlin; das Sommer-Semester 1907 in der Universität zu Erlangen; das Winter-Semester 1907—8 in der Universität zu Halle und das Sommer-Semester 1908 in der Universität zu Leipzig. Allen meinen Universitätslehrern, unter denen ich hervorhebe die Professoren Harnack, Pfleiderer, Strack, Dessoir, von Zahn, Hensel, Lütgert, Haupt, Loofs, Ebbinghaus, Ihmels, Hauck, Wundt, Volkelt danke ich an dieser Stelle.

Besondere Erkenntlichkeit aber schulde ich Herrn Professor Falckenberg, der mir stets ein guter Berater und treuer Freund gewesen ist, und der mich auch zu der vorliegenden Arbeit angeregt hat.